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The Miller case is important because
it was the last time the Supreme Court ruled directly on a
Second Amendment defense. It is unusual in that people on both
sides of a political debate claim that it supports their
position. Some say that it reaffirms an individual right to
own firearms and some say it does just the opposite.
With the extreme polarization of the
modern gun debate, this case has assumed an importance far
beyond what anyone expected in 1938. It should come as no
surprise that behind this strange state of affairs is a very
strange court case.
The story begins with the National
Firearms Act of 1934, which was the first federal law
regulating firearms. Prior to that time, it was generally
believed that the Constitution did not grant the federal
government this power The Firearms Act levied a prohibitive
$200 tax on machine guns and sawed-off shotguns. Government
officials claimed that these were the weapons of choice for
the criminal gangs that evolved during prohibition.
This law was enacted during a period
when a determined effort was being made to expand federal
police power at the expense of the states. A crafty
legislative tactic of that time was to construct new federal
criminal laws as commerce measures, which could be justified
as revenue producers in the event they were challenged by
supporters of states' rights.
Some have speculated that the 1934
Firearms Act was passed to provide job security for federal
agents who were threatened with unemployment by the repeal of
alcohol prohibition in 1933.
Like most criminal cases, U.S. v.
Miller involved some rather unsavory characters.
Jack Miller, a bank robber and
moonshiner with many enemies, felt the need to carry a
sawed-off shotgun without paying the tax. He and his
associate, Frank Layton, had the misfortune to be caught
transporting it from Oklahoma to Arkansas and were arrested in
June 1938 by federal agents on charges of violating the
Firearms Act.
They were brought before United
States District Court Judge Heartsill Ragon in Fort Smith,
Arkansas, who encouraged them to plead not guilty and
appointed an attorney to represent them. He then found in
their favor, declaring that the relevant section of the
Firearms Act was in violation of the Second Amendment and
therefore unconstitutional.
Federal law enforcement authorities
were not pleased. Judge Ragon's decision threatened the
expansion of federal power, so the case was quickly appealed
to the Supreme Court.
The resulting decision issued in May
1939 stated that "in the absence of any evidence"
the Supreme Court could not say that a sawed-off shotgun had
any relationship to the militia. The critical point here is
the absence of evidence.
The record shows that no arguments
were made and no evidence presented on behalf of Jack Miller
or the Second Amendment. The Justice Department attorneys were
able to present their case without any opposition.
Miller had no resources to finance
his argument against the government's appeal and it is
doubtful that he had any interest in defending constitutional
rights. In fact, he died before the decision was rendered. His
body was discovered in April 1939 with multiple .38 caliber
bullet wounds. His own .45 pistol lay by his side with four
rounds expended. Perhaps he had a legitimate need for that
shotgun after all.
Frank Layton must have decided that
it wasn't his job to act as a constitutional test case. After
the government's successful appeal, he entered a guilty plea
and was placed on four years' probation by the original Judge
Ragon.
Today it seems bizarre that a Supreme
Court case could be decided without the court hearing both
sides of the argument. Yet this was the perfect opportunity
for advocates of greater federal power to advance their
agenda. With no opposition, they could not lose.
But the right to keep and bear arms
was too deeply enshrined in American culture for the court to
bury it completely, as modern gun control advocates like
Senator Feinstein would have us believe.
The Supreme Court opinion, written by
Justice James Clark McReynolds, was notable in that it did not
completely cave in to the government demands. It is a rather
short document that is easily available on the Web, so you
need not accept another person's opinion about it. Read it
yourself.
The court finding simply said that no
evidence had been presented to prove that a sawed-off shotgun
was a useful military weapon. Of course that was literally
correct, since Miller's side never showed up in court.
After stating the court's opinion,
McReynolds included passages from various historical sources
to show that the militia consists of all able-bodied men who
have a right, perhaps even a duty, to own firearms suitable
for military service. There was little reason to include these
references unless McReynolds wished to protect the Second
Amendment from further encroachment.
The case was returned to the lower
court where Miller, if living, could have made further
arguments on his own behalf. He could have easily and
correctly argued that short-barreled shotguns had been popular
military weapons in the trenches of the First World War. It
was lucky for the federal government that he was dead.
The end result was a confusing
decision that is often used to support both sides of the gun
rights debate. The anti-gun lobby can say that it permits
reasonable regulation of firearms. Gun rights advocates can
say that it supports the right to own military-style weapons.
With this unsatisfying legal precedent by the highest court,
it is no wonder that the court system has not taken the Second
Amendment seriously.
Beginning with Cases v. United States
in 1942, the court system conducted a steady degradation of
the Second Amendment that was often based on
misinterpretations of the Miller case. Each time the Miller
opinion was distorted by a lower court, the new opinion became
part of case law and made it easier for the next case to
further erode Second Amendment protections.
Since judges are generally members of
society's elite, it is not surprising that they would be
hostile to the idea of ordinary people bearing arms for
personal defense or to protect against tyranny.
Law schools ignored the Second
Amendment because it was not politically correct. Students
were told that it was not worthy of study, as it applied only
to the obsolete right of states to form militias. The few
idealistic lawyers who challenged the prevailing view quickly
discovered that this was not a smart career move.
It was not until the 1990s that legal
scholars began to conduct serious research into the intent of
the Second Amendment. The overwhelming majority has concluded
that it does indeed guarantee an individual right to keep and
bear arms. This is gradually becoming more difficult for the
legal establishment to ignore.
Legal experts say that sometime in
the next few years the Supreme Court will end its half-century
of neglect and once again rule on a Second Amendment case.
U.S. v. Miller will no doubt be mentioned countless times in
the media and will be misrepresented almost every time by
self-serving politicians and biased or poorly informed
journalists.
Just remember what a strange case it
was.
Dr. Michael S. Brown is an
optometrist and member of Doctors for Sensible Gun Laws:
www.dsgl.org. He may be reached at: rkba2000@yahoo.com.
References:
Court Opinions and Documents –
Patrick L. Aultice http://rkba.org/research/miller/Miller.html
The U.S. v. Miller Revisited – JPFO
http://www.jpfo.org/miller.htm
Dianne Feinstein's Latest Incredible
Lie – Merrill Gibson https://www.keepandbeararms.com/information/XcIBViewItem.asp?ID=2303 Ms. Feinstein gets an "F"
in fulfilling her responsibilities to uphold the Constitution of
the United States. www.Findlaw.com
update; 1/22/02
Second Amendment - Bearing Arms
A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
In spite of extensive recent discussion and much
legislative action with respect to regulation of the
purchase, possession, and transportation of firearms, as
well as proposals to substantially curtail ownership of
firearms, there is no definitive resolution by the courts
of just what right the Second Amendment protects. The
opposing theories, perhaps oversimplified, are an
''individual rights'' thesis whereby individuals are
protected in ownership, possession, and transportation,
and a ''states' rights'' thesis whereby it is said the
purpose of the clause is to protect the States in their
authority to maintain formal, organized militia units.
1
Whatever the Amendment may mean, it is a bar only to
federal action, not extending to state2
or private3 restraints. The
Supreme Court has given effect to the dependent clause of
the Amendment in the only case in which it has tested a
congressional enactment against the constitutional
prohibition, seeming to affirm individual protection but
only in the context of the maintenance of a militia or
other such public force.
In United States v. Miller,4
the Court sustained a statute requiring registration under
the National Firearms Act of sawed-off shotguns. After
reciting the original provisions of the Constitution
dealing with the militia, the Court observed that ''[with
obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration
and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must
be interpreted with that end in view.''5
The significance of the militia, the Court continued, was
that it was composed of ''civilians primarily, soldiers on
occasion.'' It was upon this force that the States could
rely for defense and securing of the laws, on a force that
''comprised all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense,'' who, ''when called for
service . . . were expected to appear bearing arms
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at
the time.''6 Therefore, ''[in
the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less
than 18 inches in length' at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or
that its use could contribute to the common defense.''7
Since this decision, Congress has placed greater
limitations on the receipt, possession, and transportation
of firearms,8 and proposals
for national registration or prohibition of firearms
altogether have been made.9
At
what point regulation or prohibition of what classes of
firearms would conflict with the Amendment, if at all, the
Miller case does little more than cast a faint degree of
illumination toward an answer.
Footnotes
[Footnote 1] A sampling
of the diverse literature in which the same historical,
linguistic, and case law background is the basis for
strikingly different conclusions is: Staff of Subcom. on
the Constitution, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th
Congress, 2d Sess., The Right to Keep and Bear Arms (Comm.
Print 1982); Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment (1984); Gun
Control and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on
the Second Amendment (Robert J. Cottrol, ed. 1993);
Stephen P. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed: The
Evolution of a Constitutional Right (1984); Symposium, Gun
Control, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1986); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J.
637 (1989).
[Footnote 2] Presser v.
Illinois, 116
U.S. 252, 265 (1886). See also Miller v. Texas,
153
U.S. 535 (1894); Robertson v. Baldwin,
165
U.S. 275, 281-282 (1897). The non-application of the
Second Amendment to the States is good law today. Quilici
v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F. 2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983).
[Footnote 3] United
States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875).
[Footnote 4]
307 U.S. 174 (1939). The defendants had been released
on the basis of the trial court determination that
prosecution would violate the Second Amendment and no
briefs or other appearances were filed on their behalf;
the Court acted on the basis of the Government's
representations.
[Footnote 5] Id. at 178.
[Footnote 6] Id. at 179.
[Footnote 7] Id. at 178.
In Cases v. United States, 131 F. 2d 916, 922 (1st Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 770 (1943), the court, upholding a similar
provision of the Federal Firearms Act, said: ''Apparently,
then, under the Second Amendment, the federal government
can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single
individual as well as by a group of individuals, but it
cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which
has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia.'' See Lewis v.
United States, 445
U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (dictum: Miller holds that the
''Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia'''). See also Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th
Cir.) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge denial of
permit to carry concealed weapon, because Second Amendment
is a right held by states, not by private citizens), cert.
denied 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996); United States v. Gomez, 92
F.3d 770, 775 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting federal
prohibition on possession of firearm by a felon as having
a justification defense ''ensures that [the provision]
does not collide with the Second Amendment'').
[Footnote 8] Enacted
measures include the Gun Control Act of 1968. 82 Stat.
226, 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 921-928. The Supreme Court's
dealings with these laws have all arisen in the context of
prosecutions of persons purchasing or obtaining firearms
in violation of a provisions against such conduct by
convicted felons. Lewis v. United States, 445
U.S. 55 (1980); Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Bass,
404
U.S. 336 (1971).
[Footnote 9] E.g.,
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
Working Papers 1031-1058 (1970), and Final Report 246-247
(1971). |